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Abstract 
This article examines the relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the 
Hollywood film industry from 1947 to 1959. Surprisingly, the CIA was almost entirely 
absent from American cinema screens during this period, and their public profile in other 
popular media, including television and the press, was virtually nonexistent. This 
conspicuous lacuna of publicity coincided with what some scholars have termed the “Golden 
Age” of US covert action – an era of increasing CIA intervention in Italy, Iran and 
Guatemala, to name only the most prominent examples. How was it that the CIA managed to 
maintain such a low public profile and in the process evade popular scrutiny and questions of 
accountability during such an active period of its history? Utilizing extensive archival 
research in film production files and the records of the CIA themselves, this article suggests 
that Hollywood filmmakers adhered to the CIA's policy of blanket secrecy for three 
interrelated reasons. First, it suggests that the predominance of the so-called 
“semidocumentary” approach to the cinematic representation of US intelligence agencies 
during this period encouraged filmmakers to seek government endorsement and liaison in 
order to establish the authenticity of their portrayals. Thus the CIA's refusal to cooperate with 
Hollywood during this period thwarted a number of attempts by filmmakers to bring an 
authentic semidocumentary vision of their activities to the silver screen. Second, up until the 
liberalization of American defamation law in the mid-1960s, Hollywood studio legal 
departments advised producers to avoid unendorsed representations of US government 
departments and officials through fear of legal reprisal. Finally, this article suggests that the 
film-industry censor – the Production Code Administration – was instrumental in reinforcing 
Hollywood's reliance upon government endorsement and cooperation. This latter point is 
exemplified by Joseph Mankiewicz's controversial adaptation of Graham Greene's The Quiet 
American. Overturning existing scholarship, which argues that CIA officer Edward Lansdale 
played a decisive role in transforming the screenplay of Greene's novel, this article suggests 
that Mankiewicz's alterations were made primarily to appease the Production Code 
Administration. 
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BARTHOLEMEW: Do you know what C.I.A. is Mrs. Lambert? 
REGGIE: I don't suppose it's an airline, is it? 
Charade, 19631  
 
It is difficult to conceive of a period when America's most publicly prominent espionage 
outfit was not at the forefront of the American public's scrutiny and imagination. Today 
newspaper headlines and television broadcasts are filled with reports of rendition 
programmes and secret prisons, waterboarding and unmanned spy drones, not to mention the 
conveyor belt of conspiracy theories which are now an unavoidably real component in the 
complexion of the CIA's public identity. Hollywood has played a large part in the frenzied 
media attention which the CIA now receives. From major new franchises such as the Bourne 
series or the recent success of Angelina Jolie's exploits in Salt (2010), to more docudrama-
oriented representations in The Good Shepherd (2006) and Fair Game (2010), the immense 
popularity of the spy genre during the Cold War has been reignited in the twenty-first century 
by narratives of CIA intrigue. In short, the CIA today has assumed mythic proportions and 
inspired a veritable industry of media representations. 
Surprisingly, however, the CIA has not always maintained such a high public profile. If we 
cast our attention back to the early history of the Agency, from their inception in the National 
Security Act of 1947 up until the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961, it is striking how rarely their 
activities captivated public attention. Certainly this lack of interest was not a consequence of 
relative inactivity by the CIA. On the contrary, the 1950s is often described by intelligence 
historians as the “Golden Age” of CIA covert action, with clandestine coups instigated in Iran 
in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954, to name only a few of the most prominent examples.2 Yet for 
all these defining moments in the history of covert action, the CIA's involvement went largely 
unreported by the American media. In a survey of Time magazine's extensive coverage of the 
ousting of Mossadiq, for example, John Foran reveals that the CIA received only one oblique 
reference, which itself was not an admission of the CIA's involvement in the coup.3  
Although the Rosenberg trial, the HUAC investigations and Senator McCarthy had propelled 
the topic of espionage and domestic subversion into the limelight of public discourse, rarely 
was the “enemy within” theme transferred by the American media to an engagement with 
American espionage abroad. The same could be said for the television industry. As Michael 
Kackman demonstrates in his analysis of Cold War spy television serials, producers were 
careful to avoid any implication that the US was conducting espionage operations on foreign 
soil. As one executive for Ziv Entertainment's espionage show The Man Called X indicated, 
“Officially, our government has no foreign espionage system in peacetime. Therefore, it is 
important in our stories that when X goes to a foreign country, it must not be for the purpose 
of official or unofficial espionage.”4 Hollywood too steered well clear of narratives of 
American espionage abroad. Instead, they preferred counterespionage plots, which often 
featured the FBI or a fictionalized version of it. The CIA, by contrast, was almost never 
directly mentioned in Hollywood spy features of the era and indeed reference to them was 
often deliberately removed from early shooting scripts and treatments to avoid any political 
or legal ramifications. 
This article will seek to examine some of the reasons why American culture, and Hollywood 
specifically, offered almost no direct representation of the CIA during the early Cold War. In 
doing so, it provides three interrelated explanations. First, it argues that the CIA's refusal to 
cooperate with Hollywood filmmakers during this period acted as a form of de facto 
censorship on any direct cinematic representation of their institution. During the early Cold 
War, filmmakers habitually sought government cooperation in their endeavours to produce 
realistic “semidocumentary” representations of American institutions. When this cooperation 
was denied, which it consistently was in the case of the CIA, Hollywood studios either 
invented fictional institutions, or more commonly, avoided the subject of American 
espionage on foreign soil altogether. Second, this article will focus on the legal constraints 
placed upon studio attempts to represent public officials up until the liberalization of 
defamation law in the US in the mid-1960s. Finally, it will turn to censorship within the film 
industry, specifically the influence of the Production Code Administration upon the 
representation of US government generally and the CIA specifically. 
These explanations tend to suggest that the absence of the CIA from Hollywood features in 
the early Cold War was primarily a result of industry self-censorship rather than a product of 
any external interference by the CIA. The latter position has been argued by scholars such as 
Mathew Alford, Tricia Jenkins and Frances Stoner Saunders, who point to a few isolated 
incidents in order to suggest that the CIA maintained a systematic policy of engagement with 
filmmakers described by Saunders as the CIA's “Hollywood Formula.”5 Saunders's 
conclusions drew heavily upon a series of “movie reports” written for the CIA and the 
Pyschological Strategy Board, which she attributes to CIA officer Carleton Alsop, thereby 
demonstrating “just how far the CIA was able to extend its reach into the film industry.”6 
Film historian David Eldridge, however, has convincingly demonstrated that Saunders 
misattributed these reports to Alsop. The actual author, according to Eldridge's thorough 
work of historical Cluedo, was Paramount's head of foreign and domestic censorship – Luigi 
Luraschi.7 By misattributing the letters to Alsop, Eldridge argues that Saunders seriously 
overstated the case for the CIA's involvement with Hollywood. Luraschi was a Hollywood 
insider, not a CIA officer. His reports to the CIA originated from his own sense of patriotic 
devotion and continued at his behest through mutual cooperation between himself and the 
CIA. This contrasts markedly with Saunders's more sinister vision of a covert CIA plot 
initiated by the Agency at the highest levels of the Hollywood studio system. 
Eldridge's article significantly shifted the parameters of the debate away from Saunders's 
notion of the CIA as the “puppet master” who pulled the strings of Cold War culture, towards 
a more consensual process of cultural creation involving what Scott Lucas termed “state–
private networks.”8 Amidst an atmosphere of collaboration rather than coercion, rarely, if 
ever, did the CIA deem it necessary to hold a gun to the head of Hollywood producers. 
Supporting Eldridge's conclusions, Hugh Wilford's recent survey of the CIA's so-called 
“cultural Cold War” argued that unlike the CIA's sponsorship of elitist cultural outfits such as 
Encounter magazine, which relied upon external patronage, the highly profitable film 
industry provided no such point of access for the Agency.9  
Cold War film historians Tony Shaw and Daniel Leab provided more concrete documentation 
of the CIA's covert interference with motion pictures by revealing startling evidence of the 
CIA's patronage of the animated adaptation of George Orwell's Animal Farm.10 In order to 
support their broad narratives of government involvement with motion pictures, however, 
Leab, Shaw and Alford fail to point out the crucial distinction between the CIA's covert 
sponsorship of a foreign production company for the purposes of anti-Soviet propaganda, and 
the relationship which existed between the American film-industry and government 
departments such as the FBI and the Department of Defense for the purposes of public 
relations. In contrast to the FBI and the Pentagon, the CIA consistently refused to support 
Hollywood filmmakers and even actively discouraged Hollywood representations of 
American espionage.11  
Another frequently cited example of CIA attempts to influence the content of motion pictures 
in this period is the correspondence between CIA officer Edward Lansdale and Joseph 
Mankiewicz, who directed a politically adulterated film adaptation of Graham Greene's The 
Quiet American.12 Unlike the CIA's sponsorship of Animal Farm, The Quiet American was 
indeed produced by an American production company and Greene's novel offered a highly 
critical interpretation of the CIA's activities in Vietnam. Yet, as is later discussed in this 
article, although Lansdale did indeed contact Mankiewicz, the principal alterations to 
Greene's story were made long before this correspondence took place and were carried out in 
order to appease the industry censors in the Production Code Administration, not the CIA. 
Even in the rare instances when the CIA did engage with Hollywood productions during this 
period, their involvement was limited and their influence was preceded by cautious studio 
legal departments and industry censors. 
This is not to say, however, that the CIA's aversion to liaising with Hollywood during this 
period had no effect. On the contrary, this article proposes that it was the CIA's very lack of 
involvement with the film industry that prevented their institution from entering the lexicon 
of public mythology until the mid- to late 1960s. In this sense, given the political, legal and 
stylistic constraints of the time, one might argue that there was as much agency in the CIA's 
inactivity in Hollywood as there was in the rare examples of their direct involvement with the 
film industry. Indeed, we could characterize the CIA's influence upon Hollywood during this 
period as an “absent presence” – curtailing the representations of their activities via a refusal 
to cooperate with filmmakers who were curious about such an elusive government institution. 
In consequence, by refusing to engage with the American media during the early Cold War, 
the CIA was able to elude public attention. This in turn allowed them to evade questions 
about accountability or excessively presidential aspects of foreign policy during a period in 
which they were frequently involved in controversial covert activities. 
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The renowned American film critic and auteur theorist Andrew Sarris described the 
semidocumentary as “a passing fancy of the American cinema.”13 Yet in terms of its impact 
upon the representation of political institutions, particularly the American intelligence 
agencies, the semidocumentary was a highly significant form of historical representation in 
the early Cold War. At its core, the semidocumentary predicated the accurate historical 
representation of America's recent past upon reliable government sources – whether it came 
in the form of official endorsement, documentary evidence from the National Archives or 
technical advice from current or former employees of state. Such reliance upon government-
sourced story material required a mutually beneficial close bond of cooperation between 
Hollywood and the US government, a bond made concrete by the Second World War, in 
which Hollywood had been enlisted in support of the Allied war effort in exchange for the 
heightened realism granted through official cooperation and endorsement.14  
It was not until after the war, however, that the semidocumentary began to emerge as a 
defined format, with a number of films released from late 1945 onwards focussing on the 
wartime activities of America's intelligence services. Twentieth Century-Fox were the first to 
pioneer the technique with the release of House on 92nd Street in September 1945. 
Documenting the FBI's wartime counterespionage activities in maintaining the secrecy of the 
Manhattan Project, House on 92nd Street was made in close collaboration with the FBI and 
was overseen by J. Edgar Hoover himself.15 The film's producer, Louis De Rochemont, had 
made his name with his wartime newsreel service The March of Time, which pioneered the 
technique of staging dramatic reconstructions of contemporary news events. In many ways, 
this amalgamation of fact and fiction precipitated the semidocumentary format and afforded 
De Rochemont the self-styled title of “the father of the semidocumentary.”16 In April 1941 
and September 1942, De Rochemont had produced two short films for March of Time, 
respectively titled Men of the F.B. I and F.B. I Front. The latter dramatized the Bureau's 
infiltration of Nazi Bund organizations on American soil – playing on the “enemies within” 
theme that would come to characterize many of his films as well as the more hyperbolic 
anticommunist tirades of the 1950s. J. Edgar Hoover wrote to De Rochemont in 1942 to 
inform him, “We of the FBI obviously are extremely proud of the manner in which you have 
portrayed our activities,” and in a handwritten postscript he signed off, “It is grand to have 
such a friend as you.”17 A month later, in November 1942, Hoover awarded De Rochemont 
the FBI's Distinguished Service Cross, explaining, “I hope it will always serve as a constant 
memento of our feelings toward you.”18  
Following the considerable success of House on 92nd Street, De Rochemont turned his 
attention to the CIA's wartime predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) for his 
next film– 13 Rue Madeleine (1946). His relationship with the now disbanded OSS and its 
former head, General William Donovan, would, however, prove far more temperamental than 
the cooperation afforded to him by J. Edgar Hoover. Although initially Donovan was keen to 
promote OSS history through film, his relationship with Hollywood, and with Twentieth 
Century-Fox in particular, would soon turn sour. Almost immediately after the war's 
conclusion, Donovan set up a committee of former OSS officers to provide technical advice 
to Hollywood studios. The committee comprised such luminaries as the former head of the 
OSS Special Projects Office and past director of Republican Party publicity Colonel John M. 
Shaheen, former assistant director of OSS Edward Buxton, head of OSS operations in Europe 
Colonel Russell J. Forgan, the chief of OSS in London David Bruce, and the future Director 
of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles.19 In the spring of 1946, having worked extensively with 
Donovan's committee, Paramount released the first cinematic representation of the OSS, 
entitled simply O.S. S. Donovan's approval of the film was confirmed by a written foreword, 
signed by Donovan, which featured in the film's title sequence extolling the “brave, 
resourceful men and women, living and dead,” to whom the film pays tribute.20 At the outset, 
Donovan afforded Twentieth Century-Fox's 13 Rue Madeleine the same courtesy of 
cooperation. Donovan, along with a number of other former OSS officers, had aided De 
Rochemont during the production of the film with technical advice, documents and even 
classified footage featuring OSS training and operations behind enemy lines. As production 
was drawing to a close, however, Donovan performed a dramatic reversal of his policy of 
engagement with the film industry. In a letter to De Rochemont in the summer of 1946, 
Donovan reprimanded De Rochemont's attempt to provide an authentic representation of the 
OSS: 
The picture is a phony. With all the excellent authentic material which we have sought to 
make available to you it seems absurd that your company would persist in making a picture 
that not only lacks reality but plausibility. It is impossible for me to approve of the 
representations made in the script that this is authentic, or even a typical, story of OSS 
operations, and it would clearly be unfair to OSS agents who voluntarily jeopardized their 
lives to engage in valuable clandestine operations to couple their names and experiences with 
the events pictured in the script.21  
The reasons for Donovan's dramatic withdrawal of support from Twentieth Century-Fox's 
picture are unclear. Fox's studio head Darryl F. Zanuck, however, suspected that the film's 
story of a German agent within the OSS may have offended Donovan's rose-tinted view of 
his impenetrable former spying organization.22 Another potential source of concern for 
Donovan was the film's ending. Senior OSS officer and instructor Bob Sharkey, played by 
James Cagney, is forced to enter occupied France after one of his agents is killed. Sharkey is 
captured by the Germans and taken to their headquarters at 13 rue Madeleine, where they 
proceed to interrogate him in order to extract his intimate knowledge of the Allies' invasion 
plans. In response the OSS is forced to instruct the American air force to bomb rue 
Madeleine, and Sharkey along with it, in order to prevent the Germans discovering details of 
Operation Overlord. Not only was this a remarkably downbeat ending for a Hollywood 
melodrama, but it also dwelled upon the human cost of espionage. Furthermore, as Donovan's 
close friend and technical adviser to Louis De Rochemont, Russell J. Forgan, informed the 
producers, the OSS “would never have allowed any individual who knew all the plans for 
Overlord to have gone into France prior to D-Day.”23 Although such technical flaws in the 
film may have provided Donovan with a pretext to withdraw support, it is unlikely that he 
would have turned down such an opportunity for publicizing the activities of the OSS, had he 
not already, in part at least, managed to secure the political and public support for his 
proposals for a peacetime foreign intelligence service. 
In response to Donovan's condemnation of the film, De Rochemont and Zanuck, fearing legal 
and political repercussions, instructed director Henry Hathaway to reshoot all the scenes 
which directly referenced the OSS in order to deliberately obfuscate which intelligence 
agency they sought to represent.24 In place of OSS, the thinly veiled “077” was used, 
inspiring a sardonic review from Bosley Crowther of the New York Times: 
it seems rather odd that any movie pretending to recount such derring-do should have to 
dissemble in naming the organization involved. Yet apparently the reckless producers of “13 
Rue Madeleine” were compelled to the ultimate precaution by their own inventiveness. Thus 
it is, in this brisk and bristling picture … that an outfit called “Secret Intelligence,” not O.S. 
S., does the fancy stuff through a unit tagged “0–77” – a feeble and wistful disguise.25  
What Crowther did not foresee was the manner in which Donovan's withdrawal of support 
from 13 Rue Madeleine and the subsequent removal of all specific references to the OSS 
would set a precedent for the film industry's representation of American espionage activities 
abroad. For almost two decades, Hollywood producers and directors would deliberately avoid 
making any direct reference to the CIA, who echoed Donovan's distrust of filmmakers for 
much of the Cold War. 
Hollywood's inability to receive CIA technical support in this period was not through lack of 
trying. Filmmakers regularly approached the Agency with requests ranging from simple 
name-checks to ensure they had not inadvertently used the name of an actual field officer to 
more extensive requests for technical guidance. Such requests, however, were almost 
invariably met with incredulous refusal by the CIA. In January 1951, for example, Paramount 
contacted the CIA with regard to their motion picture My Favorite Spy, in order to check the 
names used in the film. In a handwritten note at the bottom of the memorandum the film is 
described as “a lousy picture” that “makes no reference to CIA” and in consequence “no 
further action” was to be taken.26 The following year, when Warner Brothers requested 
technical assistance in their production of a contemporary spy picture, they were informed 
that the CIA “would not only be unable to afford such guidance but that we would take every 
step to discourage the production of a picture which purported to represent current US 
espionage.”27  
Occasionally the CIA were slightly more cooperative, but not without significant 
reservations. In June 1958, for example, Robert Denton from Paramount Pictures called the 
CIA with regard to Counterfeit Traitor, in an attempt to set up a meeting between scriptwriter 
George Seaton and a representative of the Agency. According to the memorandum, the 
appointment was “tentatively made,” but it was made clear that normally the CIA–employee 
“would not have done even this much except that Denton seemed importunate.”28 More 
tangible support was afforded in 1953 to MGM, who were offered access to an unclassified 
version of a film made about the American Flyers for a motion picture they were producing 
about returning prisoners of war. Yet when this rare instance of cooperation between the CIA 
and a major Hollywood studio was brought up by the deputy assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense (William Godel) in a meeting at the Pentagon it prompted an immediate clarification 
from Tracy Barnes, who was then working under Frank Wisner as the deputy director of 
plans: 
I was told yesterday that … you made a remark substantially as follows: “Tracy Barnes' outfit 
has MGM people making a movie out on the West Coast …” If the above is substantially 
what you said, it may have created an inaccurate impression … We are … not having MGM 
make a film. We have merely made available, for possible use, some material which might be 
included to advantage in MGM's own film … I hope that you do not think that I am being 
overly meticulous but in my opinion there is a very significant difference between the 
impression which might have been created at the meeting and what we in fact have done.29  
Both Tracy Barnes and Frank Wisner were highly influential figures in the CIA's covert 
sponsorship of cultural programmes and institutions during the Cold War.30 Ironically, given 
his lack of assistance to Hollywood filmmakers, Tracy Barnes was at the same time involved 
in the CIA's covertly funded animated adaptation of George Orwell's Animal Farm. 
Similarly, before becoming head of the Directorate of Plans at the CIA, Frank Wisner 
established “Operation Mockingbird” – a programme designed to influence both domestic 
and foreign media outlets. Given the instrumental role of both Barnes and Wisner in the 
CIA's so-called “Cultural Cold War,” it is all the more remarkable that they were so reluctant 
to work with the highly amenable Hollywood studios. 
It seems relatively clear that even when limited support was provided to filmmakers, it 
stopped well short of the kind of extensive liaison efforts conducted by the FBI and the 
Department of Defense in this period.31 By contrast, the CIA preferred to avoid altogether, 
and even discourage, the attention of Hollywood. The omission of the Agency from 
Hollywood spy films in this period cannot be attributed to simple ignorance or lack of interest 
on the part of the studios. On the contrary, the desire for greater realism through the format of 
the semidocumentary generated regular requests for technical guidance and consent from the 
CIA. Like De Rochemont's 13 Rue Madeleine, however, with official approval proving 
unforthcoming, filmmakers chose to remove any direct references to the CIA, replacing it 
with (often thinly veiled) invented institutions.32 Yet the importance of obtaining implicit or 
explicit government endorsement during this period was not merely a consequence of a 
commitment by Hollywood to a certain historical methodology which positioned the state as 
the arbiter of historical authenticity. The semidocumentary also provided the studios with a 
form of protection from legal, political and industry censorship. 
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Today Hollywood filmmakers are afforded more or less carte blanche over their 
representation of public officials. In films such as Oliver Stone's J.F.K. (1991), and Robert 
De Niro's The Good Shepherd (2006), gross historical liberties, particularly with regard to the 
CIA, have been met with consternation from both the academic community and the CIA 
itself.33 Yet in spite of this, filmmakers are in a position to stretch creative license to the point 
of defamation without fear of legal recourse. This leeway now afforded to the American 
media in their representation of public officials owes much to the revolutionizing of 
American defamation law undergone in the 1960s. Perhaps the most famous example of this 
was the landmark 1964 Supreme Court decision in the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan case, 
which ruled that the First Amendment prohibited a public official from recovering damages 
for allegedly false statements relating to his official conduct unless the plaintiff could prove 
that the defendant acted with actual malice; that is, with actual knowledge that the statement 
was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth.34 Subsequent cases extended this rule to all 
“public figures,” not just public officials.35 This represented a monumental change in the law 
and resulted in far greater freedom to criticize public figures in the US than in virtually any 
other country in the world. Prior to these rulings, US defamation law was similar to English 
law, which is among the most favourable in the world to libel claimants. 
The impact of these rulings upon Hollywood's representation of US institutions was 
profound. With legal constraints lifted, the onus was no longer on studios to seek official 
endorsement or support for their representation of American public officials and institutions. 
Indeed it is no coincidence that the first explicit representations of the CIA – in films like 
Charade (1963), Operation C.I.A. (1965) and The President's Analyst (1967) and in James 
Bond's CIA companion Felix Leiter – directly correlated with this liberalization of US 
defamation law. Up until the mid-1960s, however, studio legal departments were careful to 
avoid any direct mention of CIA officials in screenplays, and indeed any reference to the CIA 
at all. Studio files and the private collections of various filmmakers reveal the often 
overlooked, but highly influential, role of defamation law in Hollywood's representation of 
the US government prior to the 1960s. Even Louis De Rochemont, who had done so much to 
propagate positive cinematic depictions of America's intelligence agencies was frustrated in 
his attempts to represent the CIA through fear of legal repercussions. Following the release of 
his 1960 espionage melodrama Man on a String, he remarked, 
We couldn't get permission from any government bureau to use in our picture, [sic] the fact 
that we were conducting espionage against the Soviets. So we had to form our own bureau in 
the thing. We called it the CBI, the Central Bureau of Intelligence, instead of CIA. But we 
were not allowed to do it. It's against the law to impersonate an agency.36  
Given the level of caution taken by Hollywood legal departments during the early history of 
the CIA, the Agency's policy of non-cooperation with Hollywood amounted to the abeyance 
not merely of “official” CIA motion pictures but of all pictures featuring the CIA. With 
government approval required to satisfy the fears of legal departments, the ball remained 
firmly within the CIA's court, who knew that, unlike today, their refusal to engage with 
filmmakers would not result in a litany of unapproved films about their organization. Indeed, 
knowing that the law provided them with protection from unsolicited representations of their 
activities, the Agency even made requests to studio lawyers to ensure that all explicit 
references to the CIA were removed from scripts.37 Aware that the CIA were invariably 
uncooperative, Hollywood legal departments in turn often simply avoided the potential need 
to contact the Agency by instructing filmmakers to use fictional institutions. In this sense, the 
Hollywood legal departments acted as a form of industry self-censorship – filtering out 
potentially libellous material before films went into production. 
A significant example of this form of industry censorship occurred during the production of 
Alfred Hitchcock's well-known spy film North by Northwest (1959). In early screenplay 
drafts of the film, the CIA is explicitly referenced in a number of scenes. Moreover, one of 
the early working titles for the film was “The C.I.A. Story.”38 In fact, a fleeting reference is 
made to the CIA in the final picture during the airport scene in an exchange between the 
central protagonist Roger Thornhill, and the CIA chief, who is referred to in the film as “The 
Professor”:39  
thornhill: You're police, aren't you? Or is it F.B. I.? 
PROFESSOR: “F.B.I. C.I.A. O.N.I. We're all in the same alphabet soup.40  
Remarkably, this was the first explicit mention of the CIA in a major Hollywood production, 
coming over a decade after the Agency's creation. Yet by burying the mention of the CIA 
amidst the alphabet soup of other intelligence agencies, the Professor's employers are 
deliberately obfuscated. This strategy of representation was no accident. Indeed, this line in 
the script was in part written for Hitchcock by MGM's legal department, who informed the 
director to change the dialogue to “add the initials of other federal agencies” as follows: 
The dialogue in the script now reads: 
THORNHILL: “You're police, aren't you? Or is it F.B.I.? 
PROFESSOR: “F.B.I. C.I.A. We're all in the same alphabet soup.” 
It is suggested it be changed to read: 
THORNHILL: “You're police, aren't you? Or is it F.B. I.? 
PROFESSOR: “F.B.I., C.I.A., O.N.I., C.I.C., M.I., A-2. We're all in the same alphabet soup.” 
R. Monta 
P.S. You don't have to use the initials of all six organizations mentioned above. If you were 
to use only four of them it would do, the idea being to avoid identifying our characters with 
any given one of those institutions.41  
In another such script alteration, Hitchcock reshot the conference-room scene in order to 
replace a sign reading “Central Intelligence Agency” with a partially concealed flat brass 
plate, half-in and-half out of the picture so that it read: 
NITED STATES 
TELLIGENCE AGENCY42  
As these alterations reveal, studio legal departments who preferred not to approach the CIA 
advised that filmmakers, through strategies of obfuscation, avoid any clear and direct 
representation of the CIA itself. In this manner, studio legal departments effectively 
functioned as a form of censorship upon the representation of the American government. 
Thus it was not until the liberalization of defamation law in the 1960s that the CIA began to 
appear onscreen as anything more than a pseudonym or composite of various American 
intelligence organisations. Prior to the 1964 Supreme Court ruling in New York Times v. 
Sullivan, defamation law empowered the state rather than the media. The significance of this 
case in effectively reversing this position cannot be overstated in any consideration of the 
changing political landscape in Hollywood during the 1960s and its ability to offer direct and 
controversial representations of the US government. 
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The Production Code Administration (PCA) is typically regarded as an arbiter of social 
decency in the motion picture industry from 1934 to 1968 whose principle concern was the 
censorship of potentially offensive explicit content.43 However, the code also served a 
political function in its defence and preservation of a respectful image of the American 
government. Section X of the code dealt specifically with the protection of “National 
Feeling,” stating, “The just rights, history, and feelings of any nation are entitled to most 
careful consideration and respectful treatment.”44 Included in the PCA's “Analysis of 
Content” form was a section dealing specifically with the “portrayal of professions,” which 
covered the portrayal of government employees, asking the person charged with completing 
the form whether the representations of such professionals was sympathetic or 
unsympathetic. Most films during this period offered sympathetic portrayals of government 
employees; however, a tick in the box marked “unsympathetic” often prompted a written 
response from the PCA urging caution on the part of the filmmakers. Furthermore, the PCA 
often advised on matters of what they referred to as “Industry Policy” with respect to the 
representation of the US government, which invariably was an effort by the code to avoid any 
unnecessary political repercussions which might damage the close relationship between the 
industry and the government.45  
The net effect of this was to underline the importance of seeking technical advice from the 
government for any desired representation of their activities. For example, in another of 
Hitchcock's spy films, Notorious (1946), Hitchcock was advised by the PCA of the need to 
seek guidance on his various representations of both foreign and American government 
departments: 
you will have in mind, I think, the need for your taking some counsel about this story with 
representatives of the F.B. I., the Navy Department, and the Brazilian Government. I think 
you know that the industry has had a kind of “gentleman's agreement” with Mr. J. Edgar 
Hoover, wherein we have practically obligated ourselves to submit to him, for his 
consideration and approval, stories which involve the activities of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.46  
In the case of the CIA, however, where no such “gentleman's agreement” existed, the PCA's 
protection of government officials from negative or unsolicited depictions simply forced 
filmmakers to remove references to the CIA altogether. Thus the CIA's public reputation was 
protected from Hollywood license by a twofold process of industry censorship and legal 
constraint. Indeed, when depictions appeared particularly derogatory, the PCA would often 
implore filmmakers to pay heed to the potential legal repercussions of their actions. For 
example, Twentieth Century-Fox's comedy John Goldfarb, Please Come Home (1965), 
inspired by the events of the U-2 spy affair, prompted a stark response from the PCA which 
informed the producers, 
If the portrayal of … the head of the C.I.A. should appear to be abusive or offensive in any 
way in the finished picture, this would be a clear cut Code violation and, in addition, an 
important matter of industry policy … you will see to it that you are well advised in both the 
legal and non-legal aspects of the matter.47  
More often than not, however, studios were keen to avoid controversy and therefore eager to 
cooperate with the PCA. As such, negative depictions of government officials were routinely 
avoided and the explicit mention of institutions such as the CIA who refused technical 
support to filmmakers were removed or left out of scripts from the outset. In the case of 
original story material, controversial screenplays were unlikely to be written in the first place; 
however, adaptations of politically sensitive novels could lead to severe rewrites in order to 
adhere to the standards of the Production Code. 
This was the case with Joseph Mankiewicz's 1958 adaptation of Graham Greene's 
controversial novel The Quiet American. Mankiewicz's changes to the novel were manifold, 
entirely reversing Greene's stark condemnation of the violent consequences of America's 
naive idealism in the conduct of their foreign policy in Vietnam. To begin with, the American 
war hero Audie Murphy was cast as Alden Pyle – the eponymous quiet American – 
generating immediate audience sympathy for a character which Greene had used as a vehicle 
for his critique of American foreign policy. What is more, the implication in the novel that 
Pyle worked for the CIA was completely removed from the screenplay. In consequence, it is 
not Pyle and the American intelligence community who supply the plastic explosives used by 
General Thé to blow up Saigon's central square, but communist insurgents. 
Recent scholarship on the film has identified it as an example of CIA interference with 
Hollywood.48 These claims are based upon correspondence unearthed between Mankiewicz 
and the famed CIA cold warrior and presumed model for Greene's quiet American Edward 
Lansdale. On 17 March 1956, Lansdale wrote a long letter to Mankiewicz offering his 
technical advice on the events depicted in the novel. In particular, he encouraged Mankiewicz 
to blame the Saigon square bombing on communist insurgents. Furthermore, according to the 
research of Jonathan Nashel, the production company, Figaro Entertainment Inc., met with 
CIA chief Allen Dulles, who was so pleased with the screenplay's rebuttal of Greene's thesis 
that he offered US government assistance to help secure location shooting in Saigon.49 This 
body of evidence would tend to suggest that the CIA were instrumental in the drastic 
alterations to Greene's novel. However, an examination of the PCA file for The Quiet 
American suggests that Mankiewicz was far more concerned about industry censorship than 
about pleasing the CIA. Indeed, Mankiewicz contacted the PCA a full four months prior to 
making contact with Lansdale. Almost immediately after Figaro had bought the rights to 
Greene's novel, Mankiewicz contacted the PCA asking for their blessing before undertaking 
the project.50 In response, the PCA raised a number of concerns about the novel, including the 
potential problem of portraying Pyle as a government employee: 
it would be necessary to portray the activities of the Young American diplomat in such a 
manner that the finished picture would not be open to the criticism that it represents unfairly a 
prominent institution such as the Foreign Service of the United States, or any branch of 
it …51  
In response, Mankiewicz explained, 
It is my purpose, for your information, to make Pyle a thoroughly attractive young man. I 
shall remove him, of course, from any branch of the United States government service; this 
will resolve any possible unfavorable portrayal of one of our governmental employees, and 
should remove your objection on that point.52  
Mankiewicz's correspondence with the PCA also led to further alterations to Greene's original 
story. One of the most striking changes comes at the end of the film. In the novel, Pyle's 
antagonist Thomas Fowler is reunited with his Vietnamese lover – Phuong – whom Pyle had 
stolen away from him with the promise of marriage. In the screenplay, however, Fowler is 
left alone and destitute. Moreover, his jealousy over Pyle's relationship with Phuong is played 
up as an ulterior motive for his role in the assassination of Pyle. 
It is clear from the PCA files that these changes were made by Mankiewicz primarily to 
appease the strong set of moral conventions imposed upon the film industry by the code. On 
several occasions Geoffrey Shurlock at the PCA raised concerns over the manner in which 
Fowler's “immoral relationship” with Phuong is presented “most attractively” in the novel. In 
consequence, Shurlock recommended the need to introduce “an adequate voice for morality, 
condemning Fowler's worthlessness. This voice could come, of course, from Pyle, possibly 
from Phuong and, to a minor degree, could be touched on in the letters that Fowler's wife 
writes.”53 In response, Mankiewicz assured the PCA that Fowler's marriage to his wife would 
have ceased to exist long before he meets Phuong and that his wife ended the relationship 
“because of his worthlessness as a human being – and her refusal to give him a divorce will 
be clearly indicated as a refusal to let him bring similar unhappiness to another woman.” 
Thus Mankiewicz clearly indicated his intention to have Fowler “represent the socially 
unacceptable concept of marriage as against Pyle's most worthy and acceptable one.” 
Informing Shurlock of these intended alterations, he wrote, 
He [Fowler] will not succeed. In my film treatment, Phuong will reject Fowler at the finish. 
Pyle, even in death, will have accomplished his purpose, he will have awakened Phuong to 
the necessity, in life, for the unselfishness of love and the security of marriage. Fowler will 
remain a bitter, hopeless man – completely and utterly alone.54  
Mankiewicz's liaison with the PCA began in December 1955 at the very earliest stage of the 
film's production, before a screen treatment had even been written and a full four months 
prior to the director's correspondence with Edward Lansdale. Mankiewicz remained in 
contact with the PCA throughout 1956 and 1957 during every stage of the film's production. 
What this series of correspondence with the PCA reveals is that Mankiewicz's alterations to 
Greene's novel came out of a desire to appease industry censors rather than from any external 
pressure from the CIA. Indeed, the timing of the correspondence indicates that almost all of 
the major changes to Greene's novel were instigated prior to his contact with Lansdale and 
Dulles. As such, their suggested amendments had a negligible impact upon an already 
drastically altered adaptation of Greene's work. 
Furthermore, the impact of the PCA upon The Quiet American clearly demonstrates the role 
the code played in censoring depictions of American government officials. When considering 
attempts by studios to represent American espionage generally and the CIA specifically, this 
example is particularly pertinent in that Mankiewicz deliberately removed any implication 
that Pyle was an American intelligence officer in order to avoid complications which may 
have arisen with the PCA. In the case of the FBI or the Department of Defense, who regularly 
liaised with Hollywood during this period, the PCA simply served to reinforce the “Industry 
Policy” of cooperation with government, recommending that filmmakers seek either official 
consent or technical guidance before representing these government agencies. With the CIA, 
however, who refused such assistance to filmmakers, the PCA's protection of government 
officials from negative or unsolicited depictions simply forced filmmakers such as 
Mankiewicz to remove references to the CIA altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
 TOP 
 STATE-SOURCED NARRATIVES: THE SEMIDOCUMENTARY AND THE 
REPRESENTATION OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE 
 NO REPRESENTATION WITHOUT DEFAMATION 
 INDUSTRY CENSORSHIP: THE PRODUCTION CODE AND THE 
REPRESENTATION OF THE CIA 
Recalling an era before Three Days of the Condor (1975) had catapulted the CIA into the 
conspiratorial framework of public mythology, the author of the original Condor novel, 
James Grady, wrote that “Before Condor – the average bookstore carried zero books about 
the Agency … Fictionally, the CIA was treated like a ghost everyone tiptoed around but no 
one touched.”55 Today, by contrast, we are bombarded with nefarious representations of CIA 
activities. In the past decade the CIA has been held accountable, in popular culture at least, 
for a litany of atrocities and failed foreign policies from the attacks on the World Trade 
Center to the intelligence failures that led up to America's military intervention in Iraq. In the 
early Cold War, CIA activities, particularly covert activities, were no less dramatic. In spite 
of this, Hollywood shied away from the kind of critical and often conspiratorial engagements 
with the Agency that now appear in cinemas on a regular basis. The contrast could not be 
starker. How is it that Hollywood's response to the CIA has shifted so dramatically since its 
creation in 1947? 
When one considers the role of other government agencies such as the FBI and the 
Department of Defense in the shaping of their institutional narratives in Hollywood during 
this period, it may seem reasonable to deduce that the CIA maintained a similar relationship 
with filmmakers during the early Cold War. Indeed, Frances Stoner Saunders and Mathew 
Alford have gone as far as to suggest that the CIA systematically interfered with Hollywood 
productions during this period, and Jonathon Nashel has claimed that Joseph Mankiewicz's 
infamous perversion of Graham Greene's The Quiet American was due to the influence of 
CIA officer Edward Lansdale upon the film's production. 
However, an analysis of CIA records, combined with research into the PCA and studio legal 
files for various spy films during this period, tends to suggest that the CIA's absence from 
Hollywood cinema in the early Cold War was a consequence of industry censorship and 
constraint rather than a result of any direct interference from the CIA. Heeding the advice of 
the PCA and their legal departments, filmmakers sought official endorsement and technical 
advice from government agencies in order to present semidocumentary narratives about the 
American intelligence community. Without such endorsement, filmmakers were extremely 
reluctant to offer any direct representation of the American government. Following General 
William Donovan's refusal to endorse 13 Rue Madeleine's representation of the OSS in 1946, 
almost no direct references were made of American espionage abroad. The CIA, following 
Donovan's lead, consistently denied assistance to filmmakers, and, in so doing, effectively 
removed itself from the prying eyes of popular culture during this period. 
To ask why the CIA was virtually absent from early Cold War culture also provides, by 
implication, an explanation of the conditions under which it began to emerge as a powerful 
symbol of American foreign policy in the mid-1960s and beyond. Hollywood in the 1960s 
witnessed not only the decline of the semidocumentary as the predominant mode of 
government representation, but also the liberalization of defamation law and the closure of 
the Production Code Administration. The so-called “New Hollywood” of the late 1960s may 
be credited with the political sea change in the American film industry during this period. Yet 
without the removal of these obstacles to the film industry's representation of the American 
government, it is unlikely that the most noteworthy onscreen critiques of US government and 
its foreign policy would have carried quite the same venom, if indeed such direct 
condemnations of American government had been possible at all. 
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